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Media concentration and systemic failures in Greece  
 
Abstract  
The Greek media landscape changed dramatically after the deregulation of broadcasting in the 
late 1980s. Despite a very significant rise in the number of media outlets the level of 
concentration is high in both the national newspapers and television markets and has increased 
during the last decade. Moreover, a major problem of cross-ownership has emerged. Strong anti-
concentration rules were never enforced and legislation aiming to curb the economic power of 
media barons was blocked by the European Commission. The interdependence between political 
and media elites and the strong clientelistic relations which characterize the Greek political 
system are identified as the main factors behind the ineffective and contradictory nature of media 
regulatory policies. 
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Introduction 
The important role which the media plays in shaping public opinion and the democratic 
process is recognized in Europe as a basis for special regulations to secure media pluralism. 
Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, democratic states are obliged to 
protect and, when necessary, to take positive measures to ensure diversity of opinion in the 
media. The European Parliament, the Commission and the Council of Europe have all 
underlined, on many reports and resolutions, the special democratic role of the media and the 
related need for pluralism, tolerance and openness (European Parliament, 2008 and 1994; 
European Commission, 2005a; Council of Europe, 2003). 
In recent years the technological, economic and social facets of globalization and 
liberalization affect ownership structures (Peruško and Popović, 2008; Sarikakis and 
Chakravartty, 2006; Ozanich and Wirth, 2004; Doyle, 2002; Compaine and Gomery, 2000). 
They appear at the same time as challenges and as opportunities to media pluralism. On the one 
hand, digitalization and the internet encourage diversity of information sources. On the other 
hand, digital convergence and the advent of transnational media conglomerates which operate in 
the wider information sector seem to strengthen a trend towards concentration of ownership. 
Under these circumstances the question of how to regulate the media market becomes 
increasingly important.  
European Union legislation does not provide for any legislation dedicated solely to the 
control of media ownership. An attempt to intervene at the Community level took place in the 
1990s but was unsuccessful. Following the publication of the Green Paper on Pluralism and 
Media Concentration in 1992, the Commission proposed the harmonization of national 
restrictions in the area of media concentrations. However, the drafting of a directive on this hot 
issue proved to be politically unworkable. Instead the Commission submitted a Communication 
to the Council and the European Parliament in which refrained from any ambitious proposals and 
simply announced a second consultation phase (Commission of the European Communities, 
1994) which led to a no action course.   
Inevitably, the rules aimed at providing plurality and diversity within the media industry 
are dealt with at national level and under the supervision of the Commission which checks that 
national rules do not hinder the achievement towards the functioning of the internal market 
(Karppinen, 2006; Harcourt, 2002; Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996). The main reason behind such 
special regulations is that competition legislation does not give a satisfactory protection against 
media concentrations which are contrary to freedom of expression and information, and to the 
level of media pluralism which is desirable in a democratic society. 
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The Directorate General for Competition has dealt with a number of acquisitions and 
mergers involving media companies. In many of these cases the intervention has had positive 
effects also in relation to pluralism. However, it can be argued that the decisions are often too 
restricted from a media pluralism point of view. This shortcoming has been acknowledged by the 
European Commission and the European Parliament which have published several documents in 
an effort to discuss the need for Community action in this field.  
At the same time member states have implemented additional rules and as a result a 
variety of concentration control measures have emerged. The criteria used to determine 
dominance and unacceptable market concentration vary across Europe. Audience share, equity 
limits, voting rights, turnover, market dominance have been used in different countries 
representing different regulatory approaches. Cross ownership restrictions are also important in 
many cases (Harcourt, 2005; Open Society Institute, 2005; Doyle, 2002). 
The specificities of digital delivery platforms make it less feasible or even irrelevant to 
apply traditional ownership limits. A trend towards the liberalization of media ownership 
provisions is observed in EU countries. Less stringent numerical limits on the number of licenses 
which a single operator can hold or more flexible cross ownership restrictions have been 
introduced. Rules to ensure fair access by third parties to conditional access systems of digital 
platforms remain important regulatory objectives but the control of concentrations in the digital 
environment is increasingly based on a set of flexible ownership limits (Open Society Institute, 
2008; Ward, 2005). 
The way media content is produced also has an impact on the overall level of plurality 
in the media (Ward, 2006). Readers who consult many newspapers and web sites sometimes find 
they contain the same articles while television viewers who switch from one channel to another 
often complain about content uniformity. In addition, the deteriorating economic conditions in 
many segments of the media sector have led to cost reductions and staff cutbacks negatively 
affecting content diversity. Many newspapers in particular narrow their reach and reduce the 
space, resources and commitment devoted to a range of topics. ‘Generic’ editorial is increasingly 
being off-shored while syndicated and centralized newsrooms are being set up to create content 
which may be tailored at a niche market (Ala-Fossi et al., 2008; Pew Research Center’s Project 
for Excellence in Journalism, 2008). 
Clearly then, diversity in the ownership of media outlets is not sufficient per se to 
ensure pluralism of media content. This is also affected by internal factors which determine how 
resources available to the media are managed. Generally speaking we can differentiate between 
external or structural pluralism and internal pluralism (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007; Doyle, 2002).  
The former relates to the plurality of undertakings active in the market, with a belief 
that a monopoly or oligopolistic dominance of the market by a few major players constitutes a 
threat to pluralism. Regulatory practice is focusing on ownership structures and their potential 
impact on the news and information markets (Just, 2009; Iosifides, 1997).  
The latter refers to quality and diversity of content and variety in the sources of 
information. The fair and diverse representation of and expression by the various cultural and 
social groups the co-existence of different media types and genres, the access by the public of the 
whole spectrum of political and ideological viewpoints and the representation of local 
communities and interests are important aspects of internal pluralism (K.U. Leuven-ICRI et al., 
2009). 
This article concentrates on issues of structural pluralism which are analyzed within the 
framework of the evolving Greek media landscape. 
 
The Greek Media in Transition 
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Until the 1980s, the Greek media scene was dominated by the public service 
broadcaster (ERT) that operated under conditions of state monopoly. At the same time, the 
proprietors of even the largest publishing firms were persons who had emerged from the ranks of 
the industry and their business activities were limited to newspaper and periodical printing and 
publishing.  
Out of the nine entrepreneurs who were active in the national newspapers section of the 
industry in 1980, four had no interest in any other company beyond the one which published and 
printed their paper. The rest controlled a total of just seven small and medium-sized enterprises, 
except those exclusively or primarily concerned with printing and publishing the Athens based 
political dailies. Furthermore, six of these enterprises were general printers or publishing houses, 
and no newspaper proprietor appeared to have any significant interests outside the industry 
(Simmons and Leandros, 1993). 
This changed in the early 1980s as big industrial and merchant capital generated from 
outside printing and publishing entered the national newspaper market for the first time. The 
substitution of ‘hot-metal’ by ‘cold-type’ composition led to capital restructuring and a dramatic 
transformation of ownership patterns. In some cases, the proprietors of well-established 
newspapers (Akropolis, Kathimerini, Mesimvrini and Vradini) unable to implement 
modernization programmes were forced to sell; while in other instances new titles were launched 
(Ethnos, Eleftheros Typos, Epikerotita, Proti) by entrepreneurs whose activities extended beyond 
the press.  
The entry of industrialists, ship-owners and other business interests into the media scene 
was an important way for these interests to try to influence public opinion and to exert pressure 
in the political arena to the benefit of their business interests. The power and prestige that 
accompanies the possession of a political daily is certainly a strong influence behind the decision 
to acquire a newspaper –although this is scarcely something which is admitted publicly (Dunnett, 
1988). However, the new opportunities opening in audiovisual media and the information sector 
in general, must also be regarded as a factor that, since the early 1980s, prompted the entry of 
capital into national newspapers. 
In Greece, broadcasting is a constitutionally regulated activity. According to Article 15 
paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution, radio and television are transmitted under the direct 
control of the State1. The Council of State (Symvoulio Epikrateias), the highest administrative 
court, initially interpreted this constitutional provision on the sense that the legislator may 
choose either to establish a public monopoly, or to allow private broadcasting under the 
supervision of the state (Council of State, Decision 5040/1987). From 1987 onwards, the public 
monopoly was gradually abolished, and a mixed system of public and private broadcasting 
established.  
Local, private and municipal radio stations were allowed in 1987 and television stations 
in 1989, with licenses granted to them by the government on the advice of the Greek National 
Council for Radio and Television (ESR), the independent administrative authority founded on 
1989. The ESR is a seven-member body, consisting of a President, a Vice President and five 
members, all appointed by the Greek Parliament.   
Law 1866/89 which abolished state monopoly in the television market gave priority to 
existing media companies and stated that among the criteria which are taken into account in 
granting or renewing a license to establish a TV station are the experience and tradition of the 
shareholders of the company in the field of mass media (Official Journal A/222/06.10.1989). 
Even worse, the ESR failed to immediately establish strictly enforceable licensing and 
conduct rules. As a result media owners grabbed transmission frequencies and commenced 
broadcasting in a legal void as regards licensing and company conduct. This arbitrarily acquired 
                                                 
1
 Available at (https://www.eispa.gr/opencms/opencms/epa_site/downloads/syntagma.pdf; retrieved 20.11.2009). 
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new mediatic power of certain media barons enabled them to demonstrate contempt and 
recurring signs of arrogance not only towards politicians but also towards society and the 
National Radio and Television Council.  
Even when legislation was existent, media entrepreneurs tended to ignore it leading to 
frequent violations of advertising and copyright rules and labour legislation. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the Greek electronic media industry was thrown into anomie right from its inception 
(Leandros, 2000; Papathanasopoulos, 1993) and that Greece represents a case of  ‘savage 
deregulation’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Traquina, 1995). 
 
Media Concentration 
The number of private television stations increased steadily since 1989 and 2 decades 
later there were 135 private analogue TV stations with national, regional or local license 
(http://www.esr.gr/news.php,  retrieved 14.8.2009). Despite the large number of outlets five 
private channels which belong to conglomerates with activities in many sectors of the economy 
dominate the scene (Mega, Ant1, Alpha, Star, Alter).  
Beneath these five major players a second layer of channels operates achieving a fringe 
viability. It consists of tens of small channels with a variety of transmission ranges all competing 
for the same small population of viewers and a piece of advertising pie. Cut-throat competition 
threatens the commercial viability of the plethora of small channels as well as the market share 
of the dominant players destroying inevitably the possibility of a decent standard of 
programming content and leading to high levels of sensationalism (Papathanasopoulos, 2001). 
Table 1 shows the TV stations’ audience shares for the period 2000-2008 and how the 
total time spent on television is distributed to the stations. The combined share of the five leading 
private channels has declined slightly but remains at an extremely high level (68.5% in 2007-
2008 compared to 74.9% in 2000-2001). All other private channels accounted for less than 16% 
throughout the period under examination.  
 
Table 1: Television stations’ audience shares, 2000-2008. 
TV Channels 2007-8 2006-7 2005-6 2004-5 2003-4 2002-3 2001-2 2000-1 
         
ET 1 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.2 5.3 5.9 5.6 6.1 
NET 10.4 9.6 10.0 8.7 8.7 6.0 4.5 4.2 
ET 3 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.6 ---- ---- 
MEGA 17.6 19.0 18.6 18.4 16.7 18.2 20.0 22.1 
ANT1 15.1 17.1 18.2 20.6 20.9 22.8 22.5 21.9 
ALPHA 14.2 14.1 16.0 13.1 12.9 13.1 13.4 15.3 
STAR 10.6 10.5 10.8 11.6 11.6 12.1 11.0 13.4 
ALTER 11.0 9.8 8.8 10.8 11.5 9.9 7.4 2.2 
Others 14.3 13.6 11.0 10.6 10.4 10.4 15.6 14.8 
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research, TV Yearbook 2000-2008. The data cover the period from 
1 September till 31 August of the following year. 
 
A significant feature of the Greek broadcasting field since its liberalization in 1989 is 
the marginalization of the public broadcaster (Zacharopoulos, 2003). However, widespread 
dissatisfaction of the public over the standard of programming content in most private television 
channels is helping the public broadcaster to improve its position in recent years. The market 
share of the three channels (ET-1, NET, ET-3) of the public broadcasting company was 17.2% in 
2007-2008 compared to 10.3% in 2000-2001. 
The print media market is also characterized by a plethora of outlets. At the end of 2008 
there were 162 daily regional newspapers and 37 Athens-based general interest, sports and 
financial dailies. Paradoxically, while the circulation of general interest dailies which are 
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published in Athens and have a national reach is falling (104.4 million copies were sold in 2008 
compared to 247.4 million copies in 1990 –see Table 2), the same cannot be said for the number 
of titles. Though a number of established newspapers suspended or ceased publication over the 
last 15 years, new titles, or old ones under new ownership, have sprung up.  
 
Table 2: Titles, circulation and concentration in the Greek national newspaper market, 1990-
2008. 
Year 
 
Number of 
titles 
Total circulation (copies 
sold) 
Average daily circulation 
 
4-firm concentration 
ratio 
1990 19 247,387,173 834,415 59.0 
1991 17 217,139,458 725,317 63.9 
1992 15 187,869,942 622,605 70.8 
1993 17 191,172,525 643,599 66.8 
1994 19 192,931,558 710,402 64.6 
1995 18 179,718,978 603,648 62.9 
1996 18 190,810,135 667,459 60.8 
1997 21 159,125,501 565,528 53.8 
1998 24 140,849,223 499,771 55.3 
1999 23 139,458,580 480,812 61.7 
2000 27 142,377,863 518,522 57.3 
2001 25 143,693,890 507,126 60.8 
2002 23 135,796,149 462,187 65.7 
2003 23 135,347,588 452,409 68.0 
2004 23 140,328,823 471,954 69.2 
2005 24 125,286,973 430,128 66.4 
2006 24 120,022,292 404,715 69.4 
2007 23 113,752,763 384,596 70.0 
2008 22 104,354,166 351,670 69.7 
Source: Derived from the Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, The Circulation of 
National Newspapers, data published each year, 1990-2008. URL, (http://www.eihea.gr; 
retrieved 14.08.2009) 
 
Examining the annual data of the Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, one 
sees that in 1990 there were 19 morning and afternoon general interest dailies published in 
Athens with an average daily combined circulation of 834,415 copies. In 2008 there were 22 
titles with an average daily combined circulation of only 351,670 copies. 
Despite the large number of titles the level of concentration is high in the national 
newspaper market and has increased considerably during the last decade. Indeed the four leading 
publishing houses controlled 69.7% of the market in 2008 compared to 57.3% in 2000, 62.9% in 
1995 and 59% in 1990. They adopted diversification strategies during the last two decades and 
they were successful in developing their activities in different sectors of the media and beyond.  
Lambrakis Press S.A. publishes Ta Nea and To Vima  (their combined share of the 
market was 29.6% in 2008), two more newspapers and 24 magazines. The company is also 
engaged in the business sectors of printing, tourism, digital economy (portals and e-commerce 
shops), book publishing and reselling, press distribution and marketing.  
Kathimerini Publishing S.A. publishes Kathimerini (15% of the market in 2008), books 
and a range of magazines. The company operates internet information portal and is engaged in 
the exploitation of printing houses and presses. 
Ch. K. Tegopoulos Editions S.A. publishes and prints Eleftherotypia (13.2% of the 
market in 2008), its Sunday edition as well as magazines covering general and specialized 
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interests that are distributed with the newspapers. The company also has strategic participations 
in companies of such sectors as free-to-air television, book publishing and call centers.  
Finally, Pegasus Publishing S.A. publishes Ethnos (11.9% of the market in 2008), five 
more newspapers and 14 magazines. Apart from the field of publishing the company is activated 
via its subsidiary companies in the fields of printing, digital economy, audiotext services, 
bookbinding, press distribution, television, musical events and TV productions.   
The increase of concentration in the national newspaper market becomes even more 
apparent if we use the Hirschman-Herfindhal Index which is calculated by summing the squares 
of the individual market shares of all firms in the industry. The US Department and the Federal 
Trade Commission regard markets with HHI between 0.1 and 0.18 (or 1000 to 1800) as 
moderately concentrated. Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 0.01 
potentially raise significant competitive concerns and may provoke scrutiny (Hoskins et al., 
2004; Albarran, 1996). In the case of the Greek national newspaper industry the HHI was 0.1566 
in 2008 compared to 0.1126 in 1990 indicating significant increase in market concentration. 
Thus, all concentration measures are consistent with respect to the direction of change.  
 
Cross-ownership 
Moreover, a major problem of cross-ownership has emerged. Whereas in other 
countries efforts were made and legislation was passed to discourage or forbid the concentration 
of media, in Greece law 1866/89 gave preference to the media companies in granting the licenses 
for private radio and television stations, while several anti-concentration rules and restrictions 
were never enforced in practice. The result was the creation of a powerful oligopoly around a 
small number of media corporations that own national dailies, radio and TV stations, many 
magazines, book publishing houses and extend their activities to the new media, 
telecommunications and culture.  
The proprietors of the four leading publishing companies have important interests in the 
electronic media and three of them (Chr. Lambrakis, Chr. Tegopoulos and G. Bobolas the main 
shareholder in Pegasus Publishing) cooperated in 1989 and created Mega  channel which have 
consistently occupied one of the first two places in terms of audience share since then. The 
Bobolas family also controls a group of manufacturing and construction companies. The 
Alafouzos family which owns Kathimerini also controls Skai channel which started broadcasting 
on April 1, 2006 as well as four radio stations and a number of shipping and construction 
companies.  
The group of companies controlled by the Bobolas and Alafouzos families can be 
characterized as general conglomerates that incorporate media enterprises in wider economic 
empires. Under these conditions the related problems of media concentration, cross-ownership 
and instrumentalization of the media have become extremely important and in certain periods 
they have dominated the public debate and even the political life of the country (Skamnakis, 
2006; Papathanasopoulos, 2005).  
Due to the large number of media outlets the problem in Greece is perceived to be the 
increase in mediatic power and its impact on the political system rather than the need to promote 
plurality. The media can pressure politicians by selectively exposing corruption, by publicizing 
the activities of certain political figures or parties and by ignoring others. Media owners can 
therefore exert strong influence on the political process and there are accusations that some 
politicians attempt to cultivate preferential relations with the media by offering state services and 
especially access to lucrative state contracts or by promising to do so in the future.  
On the other hand, political elites have an interest and systematically attempt to 
influence and up to a point control the media. The granting of television licences and the 
enforcement of anti-concentration regulation often becomes a political game and a tool in the 
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hands of the government which attempts to obtain tactical advantage over the media barons 
(Panagiotopoulou, 2004; Daremas and Terzis, 2000; Zacharopoulos and Paraschos, 1993).    
 
The Greek Paradox 
It can be argued that the evolution of the Greek media system has been affected by the 
continuing relevance of clientelism in the sense that political actors promote the economic 
interests of the media owners in exchange for political support by the later. However, as pointed 
out by Hallin and Mancini, clientelism is associated both with a tradition of evasion of the law 
and with threats by the government to enforce regulations selectively (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 
137).  
The interdependence between political and media elites explains –to a large extent- the 
‘Greek paradox’. Strong anti-concentration rules that have never been enforced are introduced in 
parallel with a ‘savage deregulation’ of broadcasting and a ‘Greek patent’ aiming at preventing 
companies interconnected with mass media businesses from obtaining public contracts.  
Law 1866/1989 which allowed the operation of private TV stations and gave priority to 
existing media companies also attempted to limit the concentration of media ownership. No 
physical or legal person could hold more than 25% of the shares in only one company that owns 
a television station (article 4, paragraph 1). This extends to relatives of that person, up to the 4th 
degree of kinship. Furthermore, according to Law 2328/1995 participation in more than 2 
different categories of media (press, radio, TV) was prohibited (article 1, paragraph 10 - Official 
Journal A/159/03.08.1995). 
In reality that law was never enforced (eg ANT1, STAR TV, Alafouzos group of 
companies) and the same is true with respect to subsequent legal efforts. In 2001 an ex-member 
of the National Council for Radio and Television revealed that the Council examined the 
shareholders lists of the television stations of national range and discovered a number of 
infringements (Psychogios, 2001).  Yet no action was taken.  
 
Media Companies and Public Contracts 
A constitutional amendment passed in 2001 (Article 14, paragraph 9) introduced new 
transparency and anti-concentration rules, which bar those active in the press and electronic 
media from participating in other economic activities that bring them in contact with the state. 
The prohibition also covered relatives, dependants or intervening companies. Since then and 
until recently the incompatibility between the ownership of media companies and state contracts 
was at the center of a judicial and institutional debate in Greece and a hot political issue 
(Alivizatos, 2004). Indeed one of the key slogans of the New Democracy party in the 
Parliamentary elections of March 2004 was its promise to crack down on corruption concerning 
state contracts with construction firms which belong to conglomerates that also possess media 
holdings. 
Initially, law 3021/2002 (Official Journal A/143/19.06.2002) allowed a relative to prove 
that he/she is financially independent from the owner of a media enterprise so that the principle 
of incompatibility does not apply. However, the Council of State decided that the provision 
included in law 3021/2002 is unconstitutional because the Constitution essentially aims at 
preventing the media from exercising any influence in the procedure of contracting out public 
operations. The judgment considers that, having in mind the particular situation of relations 
between relatives in Greece, there is a community of interests that directly influences the 
financial activities of persons (Council of State, Decision no 3242/2004). As a result, on 12 
October 2004, the ESR rejected an application for a certificate to a construction company owned 
by Leonidas Bobolas, acknowledging the identity of interests shared by him and his father 
Georgios Bobolas, publisher of Ethnos and shareholder of Mega  television station. 
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The question of breaking the power of media entrepreneurs seeking access to lucrative 
public contracts was the subject of a new law introduced by the New Democracy government 
following its success in the elections of March 2004. The new media bill was voted by the 
Parliament on 25 January 2005 and made the ban on relatives up to the third degree of relation 
absolute (article 4 - Law 3310/2005 ‘Measures for the safeguarding of transparency and the 
averting of infringements in public procurement proceedings’, Official Journal 
A/30/14.02.2005). At the same time it set at 1 percent the minimum percentage of share capital 
of a media enterprise whose ownership legally precludes businesspeople from winning state 
contracts (whereas in the previous law the threshold was set at 5 percent).  
The new law also prohibited off-shore companies from participating with more than a 1 
percent stake in a media company or in a company bidding for public contracts. ESR which was 
responsible for the application of the law, had to register all companies taking part in tenders for 
major public works and could revoke the license of a media company caught in breach of the law 
(articles 5-7). 
The Federation of Greek Industries expressed its opposition to the law, describing it as a 
‘Greek patent’ that will hurt competition and add huge costs to enterprises that are in no way 
involved in the media but do have transactions with the State. However the most important and 
at the end decisive challenge came from the European Commission. Following a letter of formal 
notice sent to Greece on 23 March 2005 and the reply from the Greek national authorities 
received on 7 April, the European Commission decided to formally request Greece to change law 
3310/2005.  
 
The Intervention of the European Commission 
The Greek government claimed that threats to pluralism and objectivity of the media led 
to the introduction of law 3310/2005 and that the national legislator has sovereign power in this 
field. The Greek government considered that the aim of the incompatibility provision is to 
prevent the creation of conditions that could endanger the essential legal principles prescribing 
transparency.  
The Commission rejected the Greek government's argument that the media could use 
their power in order to wield influence over the procedures of public procurement, which, 
according to the Commission, are to be conducted in a way that is not politically tainted. The 
Commission pointed out that law 3310/2005 breached the Community directives on public 
procurement and the principal of equal treatment of the participants, as well as the exercise of 
almost all the fundamental freedoms acknowledged by the EC Treaty.   
The Commission's request took the form of a 'reasoned opinion', the second stage of the 
infringement procedure under Article 226 of the EC Treaty. Given that the law in question was 
already producing its effects, the Commission gave the Greek Government three weeks to reply 
and reserved the right to refer Greece to the European Court of Justice (European Commission, 
2005b). 
In its response sent on 10 May to Brussels the Greek government announced that it will 
table a legislative amendment in Parliament by the end of May to postpone the implementation 
of the above law on public tenders for four months so that government officials can discuss this 
controversial legislation with the European Commission. In early November 2005 the Greek 
Parliament voted a new Act which did not automatically assume a conflict of interest when a 
media owner or shareholder bids for a public contract but it presupposes the existence of a 
judicial decision referred to the punishable act of corruption, committed by a public contractor 
(Law 3414/2005 -Official Journal A/279/10.11.2005).  
Nevertheless, the European Commission decided to take legal action against Greece 
before the European Court of Justice concerning the compatibility of Joint Ministerial Decision 
No 24014/2005 on the evidence required for the application of Law No 3310/2005, as amended 
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by Law No 3414/2005. That act provides that both participants and other so-called 
‘interconnected’ persons operating in the media market must systematically submit to the Greek 
National Council for Radio and Television a series of extracts from the judicial record as well as 
other certificates and statements, otherwise they will be disqualified (European Commission, 
2007). 
The Commission took the view that this decision introduced grounds for exclusion from 
public procurement in Greece which are incompatible with the Community directives and that it 
made the exercise of most of the fundamental freedoms more difficult or, at the very least, less 
attractive. The decision in question was therefore considered incompatible with Community law.  
Greece's reply of 29 January 2006 (in the form of a new draft decision) was not deemed to 
be satisfactory. Instead of the above documents, the new draft required tenderers – who must not 
have been convicted of any charge of corruption by means of a final judgment which has the force 
of res judicata – to make an official declaration. However, it still provided for the intervention of 
ESR, failing which the tenderer will be disqualified, before the signature of the contract and before 
any such decision has been taken with regard to the participant concerned. This draft decision was 
contrary to Community law since it provided a fresh reason for exclusion, namely in the event that 
the tenderer failed to submit the necessary documents to the Greek National Council for Radio and 
Television so that it can decide whether the tenderer may sign the contract.  
Finally, on 9 October 2007, the National Council for Radio and Television decided to 
discontinue the issuing of certificates establishing the incompatibility between the ownership of 
media enterprises and the conclusion of contracts with public entities. In fact, the competence of 
ESR is limited to issuing a certificate on the existence of such an incompatibility based upon the 
exclusive condition that a final condemnatory Court decision related to the offence of active 
corruption has been notified to the Council by the interested enterprise or by the Authority 
responsible for the tender. 
In taking this stance, the Independent Authority takes full account of a previous 
Ministerial decision (published a month earlier) listing the supporting documents for the 
registration of all these companies in a register held by ESR. The Greek government has in fact 
finally accepted all the observations of the European Commission regarding the enforcement of 
three consecutive laws (3021/2002, 3310/2005 and 3414/2005) related to this subject. In view of 
these developments, the European Commission on 17 October 2007 announced the withdrawal 
of the infringement procedure concerning this issue against Greece before the European Court of 
Justice. 
 
Recent Developments in Regulation and Policy 
The change of policy became even more apparent by a new law on ‘Concentration and 
licensing of media enterprises’ which was voted by the Greek Parliament in July 2007 (Law 
3592/2007 -Official Journal A/161/19/07/2007). The said law provides that a legal entity can 
own one television station broadcasting news and at the same time participate in an additional 
one, provided that this participation does not result in the control of the latter. The relevant 
market may be geographic (national-regional-local), or content-based (information or other), or 
technological (broadcast or subscription). Dominant position may be found also whenever 
advertising space or time grows above a threshold (regardless the content). 
With regard to the control of concentrations in the broader media market, the measuring 
criteria are the advertising expenses and the sales receipts. Moreover, a limit is set beyond which 
a (forbidden) dominant position is considered to have been reached. In the case of a company or 
an entrepreneur who operates in one media market (television, radio, newspapers or periodicals) 
a share in excess of 35% constitutes a dominant position and the relevant figure is lower if there 
are activities in two or more media markets (article 3, paragraph 3).  
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Alongside the National Council for Radio and Television, the Competition Committee 
now also has the authority to supervise the compliance with the said rules. As to when abuse 
may be found, there are three possibilities: 1) direct or indirect price-fixing or other inequitable 
terms, 2) application of unequal terms in similar situations, and 3) unjustified tied sales. 
Sanctions may be also imposed in cases of concentration or of collusive practices. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the late 1980s the Greek media system has been transformed by the entry of big 
industrial and merchant capital into the media scene and the ‘savage deregulation’ of 
broadcasting. As a result a major problem of cross-ownership and media concentration has 
emerged. In most cases important media companies followed diversification strategies. They 
extended their activities in different sectors of the industry and there were also a number of 
general conglomerates that incorporated media outlets in wider economic empires. Today, 
despite a large number of media outlets, few leading players dominate the scene and account for 
about 70% of the television and national newspaper market. 
Regulatory responses to the problems of media concentration and cross-ownership were 
contradictory and ineffective. On the one hand, the law which abolished state monopoly in 
television gave priority to existing media companies in granting a license and, more important, 
the National Council for Radio and Television failed to establish enforceable licensing and 
contact rules. Even when legislation was existent media owners tended to ignore it.  
On the other hand, a number of legal provisions that attempted to limit the concentration 
of media ownership were passed through the Parliament. However, anti-concentration rules were 
never enforced.  
Moreover, concerns about the instrumentalization of media led to a constitutional 
change and new laws aiming to bar entrepreneurs active in the media form taking part in tenders 
for major public works. Following infringement procedures by the European Commission the 
Greek government was forced to abolish conditions that excluded the owners of media 
companies from public procurement. 
The ineffective and contradictory nature of regulatory policies which attempt to 
promote structural pluralism is a symptom of the interdependence between political and media 
elites. In a media system characterized by clientelistic relations phenomena such as law evasion 
and preferential treatment of certain entrepreneurs develop in parallel with the use of laws and 
regulations as tools in political games. Within this framework the ‘Greek paradox’ of strong anti-
concentration rules that have never been enforced I believe that can be analyzed and understood.   
Media regulation is part of the political process. The concentration of ownership in a 
few hands is potentially dangerous, in that it means a concentration of influence that can be used 
for commercial, political or personal gains. This has been recognized by politicians from all 
sides of the political spectrum to the extent that constitutional amendments strengthening 
transparency and anti-concentration provisions were voted in 2001. Moreover, allegations and 
questions about corruption concerning state contracts with companies which belong to 
conglomerates that also possess media holdings dominated the campaign during the 
Parliamentary elections of 2004.  
In many European countries the problems of media concentration and cross-ownership 
have evolved in a climate of relative public indifference. In Greece by contrast these issues have 
remained at the centre of the public debate throughout the period under examination. Yet, the 
political system failed in its efforts to curb the increase in mediatic power. Even worse 
democracy has been subverted and diminished by the conditions of anomie that prevailed in 
broadcasting as media interests managed to manipulate the political process to their own ends. It 
seems that at the end of the day, despite all the allegations and promises, clientelistic relations 
ensured the continuation of alignments between media and political elites. 
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